Pakistan’s nuclear profile: Sun2Surf

Ziad Haider

PAKISTAN encapsulates some of the key security challenges facing the international community. The presence of al-Qaeda and nuclear weapons on its soil under the overhang of conflict-prone ties with India remain critical geo-political concerns.

Although media coverage related to Pakistan has emphasised the militancy issue in light of the violence in Pakistan and the conflict in Afghanistan, analysing the full dimensions of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is essential to understanding its security profile. Pakistan’s nuclear engagement began in 1955 as part of the Atoms for Peace programme launched by the US. Thirty-seven Pakistani scientists trained at US atomic facilities and a small research facility was established in Pakistan with US assistance.

Yet following Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war with India, its nuclear ambitions were weaponised.

In 1972, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared, “if India builds the Bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry. But we will get one of our own.”

Two decades later in May 1998, in a series of tit-for-tat nuclear tests, India and Pakistan officially joined the nuclear club. Estimates suggest Pakistan has enough material for sixty to hundred bombs deliverable by attack aircraft and missiles.

To ensure proper command and control over this arsenal, in February 2002, the National Command Authority (NCA) was set up to formulate policy and exercise employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and organisations.

Under a presidential ordinance passed by Gen Musharraf in 2007, the president was to chair the NCA that was to include the prime minister as vice-chairman and senior cabinet and military officials. Last November, President Zardari handed his powers in the NCA to the prime minister though real control remains with the military.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is geared toward ensuring a “credible minimum deterrent” against India. As a result of India’s conventional military superiority, Pakistan has refrained from adopting a no-first-use doctrine, ie it retains the right to use nuclear weapons in a conflict even if it has not been attacked with them. Pakistan has not articulated a formal nuclear doctrine; however, in January 2002, Gen Khalid Kidwai who chairs the NCA’s secretariat outlined general conditions of use: if India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; destroys a large part either of its land or air forces; proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan; or pushes Pakistan into political destabilisation or creates a large scale internal subversion.

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